diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/changelog.rst | 35 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/development/submitting-patches.rst | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/hazmat/primitives/symmetric-encryption.rst | 88 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/hazmat/primitives/twofactor.rst | 138 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/random-numbers.rst | 6 |
5 files changed, 145 insertions, 127 deletions
diff --git a/docs/changelog.rst b/docs/changelog.rst index b87b8722..565b0521 100644 --- a/docs/changelog.rst +++ b/docs/changelog.rst @@ -1,34 +1 @@ -Changelog -========= - -0.3 - 2014-XX-XX -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -* Added :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.twofactor.hotp.HOTP`. - -0.2.1 - 2014-02-22 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -* Fix a bug where importing cryptography from multiple paths could cause initialization to fail. - -0.2 - 2014-02-20 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -* Added :doc:`/hazmat/backends/commoncrypto`. -* Added initial :doc:`/hazmat/bindings/commoncrypto`. -* Removed ``register_cipher_adapter`` method from - :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.backends.interfaces.CipherBackend`. -* Added support for the OpenSSL backend under Windows. -* Improved thread-safety for the OpenSSL backend. -* Fixed compilation on systems where OpenSSL's ``ec.h`` header is not - available, such as CentOS. -* Added :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2.PBKDF2HMAC`. -* Added :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf.HKDF`. -* Added :doc:`/hazmat/backends/multibackend`. -* Set default random for the :doc:`/hazmat/backends/openssl` to the OS random engine. -* Added :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.algorithms.CAST5` (CAST-128) support. - -0.1 - 2014-01-08 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -* Initial release. - +.. include:: ../CHANGELOG.rst diff --git a/docs/development/submitting-patches.rst b/docs/development/submitting-patches.rst index 5dca3f79..1797b9c1 100644 --- a/docs/development/submitting-patches.rst +++ b/docs/development/submitting-patches.rst @@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ follow the directions on the :doc:`security page </security>`. Code ---- -When in doubt, refer to :pep:`8` for Python code. +When in doubt, refer to :pep:`8` for Python code. You can check if your code +meets our automated requirements by running ``flake8`` against it. If you've +installed the development requirements this will automatically use our +configuration. You can also run the ``tox`` job with ``tox -e pep8``. `Write comments as complete sentences.`_ diff --git a/docs/hazmat/primitives/symmetric-encryption.rst b/docs/hazmat/primitives/symmetric-encryption.rst index d91dde9d..2306c5b7 100644 --- a/docs/hazmat/primitives/symmetric-encryption.rst +++ b/docs/hazmat/primitives/symmetric-encryption.rst @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Algorithms choice for encryption. :param bytes key: The secret key, either ``128``, ``192``, or ``256`` bits. - This must be kept secret. + This must be kept secret. .. class:: Camellia(key) @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Algorithms is not as widely studied or deployed. :param bytes key: The secret key, either ``128``, ``192``, or ``256`` bits. - This must be kept secret. + This must be kept secret. .. class:: TripleDES(key) @@ -108,12 +108,11 @@ Algorithms is incredibly slow; old applications should consider moving away from it. :param bytes key: The secret key, either ``64``, ``128``, or ``192`` bits - (note that DES functionally uses ``56``, ``112``, or - ``168`` bits of the key, there is a parity byte in each - component of the key), in some materials these are - referred to as being up to three separate keys (each - ``56`` bits long), they can simply be concatenated to - produce the full key. This must be kept secret. + (note that DES functionally uses ``56``, ``112``, or ``168`` bits of + the key, there is a parity byte in each component of the key), in some + materials these are referred to as being up to three separate keys + (each ``56`` bits long), they can simply be concatenated to produce the + full key. This must be kept secret. .. class:: CAST5(key) @@ -124,7 +123,7 @@ Algorithms a variable key length cipher and supports keys from 40-128 bits in length. :param bytes key: The secret key, 40-128 bits in length (in increments of - 8). This must be kept secret. + 8). This must be kept secret. Weak Ciphers ------------ @@ -142,7 +141,7 @@ Weak Ciphers that users of Blowfish move to newer algorithms, such as :class:`AES`. :param bytes key: The secret key, 32-448 bits in length (in increments of - 8). This must be kept secret. + 8). This must be kept secret. .. class:: ARC4(key) @@ -151,8 +150,7 @@ Weak Ciphers mode constructions. :param bytes key: The secret key, ``40``, ``56``, ``64``, ``80``, ``128``, - ``192``, or ``256`` bits in length. This must be kept - secret. + ``192``, or ``256`` bits in length. This must be kept secret. .. doctest:: @@ -182,17 +180,12 @@ Modes **Padding is required when using this mode.** :param bytes initialization_vector: Must be random bytes. They do not need - to be kept secret (they can be included - in a transmitted message). Must be the - same number of bytes as the - ``block_size`` of the cipher. Each time - something is encrypted a new - ``initialization_vector`` should be - generated. Do not reuse an - ``initialization_vector`` with - a given ``key``, and particularly do - not use a constant - ``initialization_vector``. + to be kept secret (they can be included in a transmitted message). Must + be the same number of bytes as the ``block_size`` of the cipher. Each + time something is encrypted a new ``initialization_vector`` should be + generated. Do not reuse an ``initialization_vector`` with a given + ``key``, and particularly do not use a constant + ``initialization_vector``. A good construction looks like: @@ -226,12 +219,11 @@ Modes **This mode does not require padding.** :param bytes nonce: Should be random bytes. It is critical to never reuse a - ``nonce`` with a given key. Any reuse of a nonce - with the same key compromises the security of every - message encrypted with that key. Must be the same - number of bytes as the ``block_size`` of the cipher - with a given key. The nonce does not need to be kept - secret and may be included alongside the ciphertext. + ``nonce`` with a given key. Any reuse of a nonce with the same key + compromises the security of every message encrypted with that key. Must + be the same number of bytes as the ``block_size`` of the cipher with a + given key. The nonce does not need to be kept secret and may be + included alongside the ciphertext. .. class:: OFB(initialization_vector) @@ -241,12 +233,9 @@ Modes **This mode does not require padding.** :param bytes initialization_vector: Must be random bytes. They do not need - to be kept secret (they can be included - in a transmitted message). Must be the - same number of bytes as the - ``block_size`` of the cipher. Do not - reuse an ``initialization_vector`` with - a given ``key``. + to be kept secret (they can be included in a transmitted message). Must + be the same number of bytes as the ``block_size`` of the cipher. Do not + reuse an ``initialization_vector`` with a given ``key``. .. class:: CFB(initialization_vector) @@ -256,12 +245,9 @@ Modes **This mode does not require padding.** :param bytes initialization_vector: Must be random bytes. They do not need - to be kept secret (they can be included - in a transmitted message). Must be the - same number of bytes as the - ``block_size`` of the cipher. Do not - reuse an ``initialization_vector`` with - a given ``key``. + to be kept secret (they can be included in a transmitted message). Must + be the same number of bytes as the ``block_size`` of the cipher. Do not + reuse an ``initialization_vector`` with a given ``key``. .. class:: GCM(initialization_vector, tag=None) @@ -282,13 +268,10 @@ Modes **This mode does not require padding.** :param bytes initialization_vector: Must be random bytes. They do not need - to be kept secret (they can be included - in a transmitted message). NIST - `recommends 96-bit IV length`_ for - performance critical situations, but it - can be up to 2\ :sup:`64` - 1 bits. - Do not reuse an ``initialization_vector`` - with a given ``key``. + to be kept secret (they can be included in a transmitted message). NIST + `recommends 96-bit IV length`_ for performance critical situations, but + it can be up to 2\ :sup:`64` - 1 bits. Do not reuse an + ``initialization_vector`` with a given ``key``. .. note:: @@ -300,8 +283,8 @@ Modes (32-bits). Applications **must** verify the tag is the expected length to guarantee the expected security margin. - :param bytes tag: The tag bytes to verify during decryption. When encrypting - this must be None. + :param bytes tag: The tag bytes to verify during decryption. When + encrypting this must be ``None``. .. testcode:: @@ -428,8 +411,7 @@ Interfaces :return bytes: Returns the remainder of the data. :raises ValueError: This is raised when the data provided isn't - correctly padded to be a multiple of the - algorithm's block size. + correctly padded to be a multiple of the algorithm's block size. Once ``finalize`` is called this object can no longer be used and :meth:`update` and :meth:`finalize` will raise @@ -473,7 +455,7 @@ Interfaces :return bytes: Returns the tag value as bytes. :raises: :class:`~cryptography.exceptions.NotYetFinalized` if called - before the context is finalized. + before the context is finalized. .. _`described by Colin Percival`: http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2009-06-11-cryptographic-right-answers.html diff --git a/docs/hazmat/primitives/twofactor.rst b/docs/hazmat/primitives/twofactor.rst index 9d661612..3df1a147 100644 --- a/docs/hazmat/primitives/twofactor.rst +++ b/docs/hazmat/primitives/twofactor.rst @@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ codes (HMAC). .. currentmodule:: cryptography.hazmat.primitives.twofactor.hotp -.. class:: HOTP(key, length, backend) +.. class:: HOTP(key, length, algorithm, backend) .. versionadded:: 0.3 - HOTP objects take a ``key`` and ``length`` parameter. The ``key`` - should be randomly generated bytes and is recommended to be 160 bits in - length. The ``length`` parameter controls the length of the generated - one time password and must be >= 6 and <= 8. + HOTP objects take a ``key``, ``length`` and ``algorithm`` parameter. The + ``key`` should be randomly generated bytes and is recommended to be 160 + bits in length. The ``length`` parameter controls the length of the + generated one time password and must be >= 6 and <= 8. This is an implementation of :rfc:`4226`. @@ -29,55 +29,64 @@ codes (HMAC). >>> import os >>> from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.twofactor.hotp import HOTP - - >>> key = b"12345678901234567890" - >>> hotp = HOTP(key, 6, backend=default_backend()) - >>> hotp.generate(0) - '755224' - >>> hotp.verify(b"755224", 0) - - :param bytes key: Secret key as ``bytes``. This value must be generated in a - cryptographically secure fashion and be at least 128 bits. - It is recommended that the key be 160 bits. + >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes import SHA1 + >>> key = os.urandom(16) + >>> hotp = HOTP(key, 6, SHA1(), backend=default_backend()) + >>> hotp_value = hotp.generate(0) + >>> hotp.verify(hotp_value, 0) + + :param bytes key: Per-user secret key. This value must be kept secret + and be at least 128 bits. It is recommended that the + key be 160 bits. :param int length: Length of generated one time password as ``int``. + :param HashAlgorithm algorithm: A + :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes` + provider. :param backend: A :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.backends.interfaces.HMACBackend` provider. - :raises ValueError: This is raised if the provided ``key`` is shorter 128 bits - or if the ``length`` parameter is not between 6 to 8. - + :raises ValueError: This is raised if the provided ``key`` is shorter than + 128 bits or if the ``length`` parameter is not 6, 7 or 8. + :raises UnsupportedAlgorithm: This is raised if the provided ``algorithm`` + is not :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHA1()`, + :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHA256()` or + :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHA512()`. .. method:: generate(counter) - :param int counter: The counter value used to generate the one time password. + :param int counter: The counter value used to generate the one time + password. :return bytes: A one time password value. .. method:: verify(hotp, counter) :param bytes hotp: The one time password value to validate. - :param bytes counter: The counter value to validate against. - :raises cryptography.exceptions.InvalidToken: This is raised when the supplied HOTP - does not match the expected HOTP. + :param int counter: The counter value to validate against. + :raises cryptography.exceptions.InvalidToken: This is raised when the + supplied HOTP does not match the expected HOTP. Throttling ----------- +~~~~~~~~~~ -Due to the fact that the HOTP algorithm generates rather short tokens that are 6 - 8 digits -long, brute force attacks are possible. It is highly recommended that the server that -validates the token implement a throttling scheme that locks out the account for a period of -time after a number of failed attempts. The number of allowed attempts should be as low as -possible while still ensuring that usability is not significantly impacted. +Due to the fact that the HOTP algorithm generates rather short tokens that are +6 - 8 digits long, brute force attacks are possible. It is highly recommended +that the server that validates the token implement a throttling scheme that +locks out the account for a period of time after a number of failed attempts. +The number of allowed attempts should be as low as possible while still +ensuring that usability is not significantly impacted. Re-synchronization of the Counter ---------------------------------- +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -The server's counter value should only be incremented on a successful HOTP authentication. -However, the counter on the client is incremented every time a new HOTP value is requested. -This can lead to the counter value being out of synchronization between the client and server. +The server's counter value should only be incremented on a successful HOTP +authentication. However, the counter on the client is incremented every time a +new HOTP value is requested. This can lead to the counter value being out of +synchronization between the client and server. -Due to this, it is highly recommended that the server sets a look-ahead window that allows the -server to calculate the next ``x`` HOTP values and check them against the supplied HOTP value. -This can be accomplished with something similar to the following code. +Due to this, it is highly recommended that the server sets a look-ahead window +that allows the server to calculate the next ``x`` HOTP values and check them +against the supplied HOTP value. This can be accomplished with something +similar to the following code. .. code-block:: python @@ -86,11 +95,66 @@ This can be accomplished with something similar to the following code. correct_counter = None otp = HOTP(key, 6, default_backend()) - for count in range(counter, counter+look_ahead): + for count in range(counter, counter + look_ahead): try: otp.verify(hotp, count) correct_counter = count except InvalidToken: pass - return correct_counter
\ No newline at end of file + return correct_counter + +.. currentmodule:: cryptography.hazmat.primitives.twofactor.totp + +.. class:: TOTP(key, length, algorithm, time_step, backend) + + TOTP objects take a ``key``, ``length``, ``algorithm`` and ``time_step`` + parameter. The ``key`` should be randomly generated bytes and is recommended + to be as long as your hash function's output (e.g 256-bit for SHA256). + The ``length`` parameter controls the length of the generated one time + password and must be >= 6 and <= 8. + + This is an implementation of :rfc:`6238`. + + .. doctest:: + + >>> import os + >>> import time + >>> from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend + >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.twofactor.totp import TOTP + >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes import SHA1 + >>> key = os.urandom(16) + >>> totp = TOTP(key, 8, SHA1(), 30, backend=default_backend()) + >>> time_value = time.time() + >>> totp_value = totp.generate(time_value) + >>> totp.verify(totp_value, time_value) + + :param bytes key: Per-user secret key. This value must be kept secret + and be at least 128 bits. It is recommended that the + key be 160 bits. + :param int length: Length of generated one time password as ``int``. + :param HashAlgorithm algorithm: A + :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes` + provider. + :param int time_step: The time step size. The recommended size is 30. + :param backend: A + :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.backends.interfaces.HMACBackend` + provider. + :raises ValueError: This is raised if the provided ``key`` is shorter than + 128 bits or if the ``length`` parameter is not 6, 7 or 8. + :raises UnsupportedAlgorithm: This is raised if the provided ``algorithm`` + is not :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHA1()`, + :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHA256()` or + :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHA512()`. + + .. method:: generate(time) + + :param int time: The time value used to generate the one time password. + :return bytes: A one time password value. + + .. method:: verify(totp, time) + + :param bytes totp: The one time password value to validate. + :param int time: The time value to validate against. + :raises cryptography.exceptions.InvalidToken: This is raised when the + supplied TOTP does not match the expected TOTP. diff --git a/docs/random-numbers.rst b/docs/random-numbers.rst index cd73a7b7..12969d1c 100644 --- a/docs/random-numbers.rst +++ b/docs/random-numbers.rst @@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ want to use the standard :mod:`random` module APIs. This is because they do not provide a cryptographically secure random number generator, which can result in major security issues depending on the algorithms in use. -Therefore, it is our recommendation to always use your operating system's -provided random number generator, which is available as ``os.urandom()``. For +Therefore, it is our recommendation to `always use your operating system's +provided random number generator`_, which is available as ``os.urandom()``. For example, if you need 16 bytes of random data for an initialization vector, you can obtain them with: @@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ can obtain them with: >>> import os >>> os.urandom(16) '...' + +.. _`always use your operating system's provided random number generator`: http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/02/25/safely-generate-random-numbers/ |