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* Add flags to error on compile with incompatible pointer type (#4455)Paul Kehrer2018-09-054-21/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * try something a bit different. * newer compiler plz * permute * fix some warnings * fix getters on OpenSSL < 1.1.0 * this is getting involved * given our compiler flags we can't have SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb
* don't sort the serial numbers in a parsed CRL (#4457)Paul Kehrer2018-09-041-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | * don't sort the serial numbers in a parsed CRL OpenSSL sorts them in place and this breaks the signature and more. fixes #4456 * cache the sorted CRL (but create it lazily) * use the cache decorator
* OCSP bindings (#4449)Paul Kehrer2018-09-012-0/+97
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * add many OCSP bindings Much of OCSP was opaqued in 1.1.0 so this also adds a bunch of getters for older OpenSSL. However, 1.1.0 itself made it impossible to access certain fields in the opaque struct, so we're forced to de-opaque them for 1.1.0 through 1.1.0i as well as 1.1.1-pre1 through 1.1.1-pre9. There is a patch (openssl/openssl#7082) that fixes this and should be in 1.1.0j and 1.1.1-pre10 (or 1.1.1 final, whichever they choose to issue) * backslashes are sometimes useful * comments
* small refactor of OCSP request parsing (#4447)Paul Kehrer2018-09-011-38/+54
| | | | This allows us to reuse these functions in the OCSPResponse object in the future
* Fixes #4333 -- added support for precert poison extension (#4442)Alex Gaynor2018-08-315-6/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Fixes #4333 -- added support for precert poison extension * Make work on all OpenSSL versions * fixed flake8 + docs * fix for older OpenSSLs * document this * spell
* Simplify OCSP no check serialization (#4444)Alex Gaynor2018-08-312-5/+5
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* OCSP response abstract base classes (#4431)Paul Kehrer2018-08-311-0/+130
| | | | | | | | | | | | * ocsp response abc * collapse SingleReponse into OCSPResponse now that we only support one * split responder_id into two properties, add tbs_response_bytes * typo * rename one method and add a mapping we'll need shortly
* refactor ocsp request parsing and generation to support only one cert (#4439)Paul Kehrer2018-08-313-83/+36
| | | | | | | | * refactor ocsp request parsing and generation to support only one cert * small doc change * notimplementederror
* Fixes #3460 -- deprecate OpenSSL 1.0.1 (#4427)Alex Gaynor2018-08-311-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | * Fixes #3460 -- deprecate OpenSSL 1.0.1 * We need to import warnings * flake8 * words are hard * rephrase
* Fixed two memory leaks in x509 csr extensions (#4434)Alex Gaynor2018-08-313-3/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | * Fixed a memory leak in x.509 OCSP no check * Fix the _actual_ leak * Speed up symbolizations * Disable backtrace by default, because it doesn't work on Windows * line length
* make an ocsp request (#4402)Paul Kehrer2018-08-303-0/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * make an ocsp request * update test, add docs * make it an OCSPRequestBuilder * review feedback and more tests * make it a class * empty commit to retrigger * type check
* 1.1.0 locks (#4420)Paul Kehrer2018-08-293-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | * Do conditional compiling of Cryptography_setup_ssl_threads * Check Cryptography_HAS_LOCKING_CALLBACKS before initing static locks Check if compiling and initing locking callbacks is necessary PEP8 fix * Make test_crypto_lock_init more complete
* add bindings for SCT creation (#4407)Paul Kehrer2018-08-202-0/+22
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* OCSP request parsing (#4393)Paul Kehrer2018-08-153-0/+209
| | | | | | | | | | | | * add public_bytes to OCSPRequest * review feedback * OCSP request parsing * change some prose * add __len__ as a required method
* Added missing methods from CRL Interface (#4400)Alex Gaynor2018-08-151-0/+18
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* Refs #4375 -- integrate wycheproof AES CCM tests (#4379)Alex Gaynor2018-08-021-1/+1
| | | | | | * Refs #4375 -- integrate wycheproof AES CCM tests * Skip these tests if we don't have CCM support
* Add more SSL_CIPHER_* functions, necessary to implement ctx.get_ciphers() in ↵Amaury Forgeot d'Arc2018-07-232-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PyPy (#4364) * Add more SSL_CIPHER_* functions, necessary to implement ctx.get_ciphers() added by Python 3.6.1. * Add placeholders for other versions * Remove parameter names * LibreSSL 2.7 has the new functions * Add entries in _conditional.py * SSL_CIPHER_get_id returns int, not char*
* sign is a method (#4362)Paul Kehrer2018-07-201-1/+1
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* reopen master (#4359)Paul Kehrer2018-07-181-1/+1
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* bump version and changelog for 2.3 release (#4356)Paul Kehrer2018-07-181-1/+1
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* also check iv length for GCM nonce in AEAD (#4350)Paul Kehrer2018-07-171-0/+2
| | | | | | * also check iv length for GCM nonce in AEAD * ugh
* raise ValueError on zero length GCM IV (#4348)Paul Kehrer2018-07-171-0/+2
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* disallow implicit tag truncation with finalize_with_tag (#4342)Paul Kehrer2018-07-172-0/+6
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* add crl.get_revoked_certificate method (#4331)Paul Kehrer2018-07-163-0/+28
| | | | | | | | * add crl.get_revoked_certificate method * lexicographic is the best ographic * rename
* Change the exception we raise in keywrap unwrapping on invalid length (#4337)Alex Gaynor2018-07-161-3/+3
| | | I believe this can reasonably be considered backwards compatible since other invalid inputs already lead to InvalidUnwrap, and clients shouldn't be distinguishing between these two conditions, and ValueError wasn't documented anyways.
* document one shot AEAD length restrictions (#4322)Paul Kehrer2018-07-141-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * document one shot AEAD length restrictions * write a test that won't consume infinity ram continue to raise OverflowError since that's what cffi did. * this applies to associated_data too * remove unneeded arg * review feedback on docs
* raise valueerror for null x25519 derived keys (#4332)Paul Kehrer2018-07-121-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | * raise valueerror for null x25519 derived keys OpenSSL errors when it hits this edge case and a null shared key is bad anyway so let's raise an error * empty commit
* we don't actually care about the errstack here, it's an invalid signature ↵Paul Kehrer2018-07-101-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | (#4325) * we don't actually care about the errstack here, it's an invalid signature We previously had no cases where we could error without getting errors on the error stack, but wycheproof contains test cases that can error without adding anything to the stack. Accordingly, we should clear the stack but raise InvalidSignature no matter what (rather than InternalError if we have no error msgs) * add a test
* fix a memory leak when calling X25519PrivateKey.public_key() (#4326)Paul Kehrer2018-07-101-0/+4
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* fix encoding BMPString in x509 name entries (#4321)Paul Kehrer2018-07-091-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | Previously we encoded them as UTF-8, but as best I can tell in reality a BMPString is fixed-width basic multilingual plane big endian encoding. This is basically UCS-2 (aka original Unicode). However, Python doesn't support UCS-2 encoding so we need to use utf_16_be. This means you can encode surrogate code points that are invalid in the context of what a BMPString is supposed to be, but in reality I strongly suspect the sane encoding ship has sailed and dozens if not hundreds of implementations both do this and expect other systems to handle their nonsense.
* Make RelativeDistinguishedName preserve attribtue order (#4306)Marti Raudsepp2018-07-091-3/+8
| | | | Duplicate attributes now raise an error instead of silently discarding duplicates.
* Convert a pair of asserts to use openssl_assert (#4318)Alex Gaynor2018-07-091-2/+2
| | | We have an existence proof that the latter assertion can be triggered, and I bet the former can too.
* Make our locking setup function compy with our style guide (#4316)Alex Gaynor2018-07-062-3/+3
| | | And not expose an unprefixed name to anyone who dlopens us.
* set an OPENSSL_API_COMPAT level (#4313)Paul Kehrer2018-07-061-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | * set an OPENSSL_API_COMPAT level this helps prevent adding deprecated functions and will let us see what we need to/can prune in the distant future when we support only 1.1.0+ * raise the api compat to 1.0.1 (which doesn't matter but is less confusing)
* since the generator order is 570 bits this should be 570 (#4307)Paul Kehrer2018-07-041-1/+1
| | | but key_size is nonsense and we'll deprecate it next
* Revert the const bits of #4220. (#4276)David Benjamin2018-06-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In #4220, I switched BIO_new to take a const pointer (true in 1.1.0, but not 1.0.2) on grounds that: This also folds in the const bits from 1.1.0, on the assumption that, now that the function pointer check is gone, it will just cause cffi to generate more conservative pointer types that work for 1.0.2 as well. But I got this backwards. If the bindings say BIO_METHOD*, cffi will pass a BIO_METHOD* to BIO_new, which works in both OpenSSL versions. If it says const BIO_METHOD*, cffi will pass const BIO_METHD* to BIO_new, which does not work in 1.0.2. (Although cryptography.io's build ignores all these warnings anyway, so it's kind of moot.)
* Add OID for RSASSA-PSS X.509 signature algorithm (RFC 4055) (#4294)Marti Raudsepp2018-06-292-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | In 2005, IETF devised a more secure padding scheme to replace PKCS #1 v1.5. To make sure that nobody can easily support or use it, they mandated lots of complicated parameters in the certificate, unlike any other X.509 signature scheme. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4055 `_SIG_OIDS_TO_HASH` and `Certificate.signature_hash_algorithm` cannot be supported as-is, because the hash algorithm is defined in the signature algorithm parameters, not by the OID itself.
* Exposed OpenSSL prime methods (#4292)Quinten Stokkink2018-06-221-0/+6
| | | These are required by the Tribler project.
* Perform an OPENSSL_cleanup before checking the heap in our memleak tests (#4293)Alex Gaynor2018-06-202-1/+15
| | | | | | | | | | * Perform an OPENSSL_cleanup before checking the heap in our memleak tests * Make this binding conditional * typo * need to put this call before we reset the function ptrs
* Add clearer message when key type is not bytes (#4289)Vladyslav Moisieienkov2018-06-201-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | * Add clearer message in Cipher when key is not bytes * Change location of key type check to verify_key_size function * Replace formated error message with static * Add key type check tests to all ciphers constructors * Change key type error message to lowercase
* LibreSSL 2.7.x support (#4270)Paul Kehrer2018-05-308-17/+25
| | | | | | | | * libre 2.7.3 compatibility * add a changelog * actually build against 2.7.3
* Removes branches in bindings for various OpenSSL 1.1.0 prereleases (#4269)Alex Gaynor2018-05-316-18/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Remove defines for openssl 1.1.0 pre * Update bio.py * Update dh.py * Update dsa.py * Update rsa.py * Update x509_vfy.py * Compress branches
* deprecate pythons without hmac.compare_digest (#4261)Paul Kehrer2018-05-242-0/+10
| | | | | | * deprecate the constant time bytes comparison path old python 2.7.x uses * pep8
* Fixed build errors on HP-UX. (#4259)dumol2018-05-222-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | * Fixed build errors on HP-UX. * PEP 8 style fix. * No return for void function. * PEP 8 style fix, take 2.
* remove block size as a required part of HashAlgorithm (#4249)Paul Kehrer2018-05-161-6/+0
| | | | | | Internal block size isn't a particularly useful piece of information and constructions like SHA3 make it even harder to determine what that really means. Accordingly, we're removing it from the interface (but leaving it on all existing hashes)
* Cleanup unused err bindings. (#4246)David Benjamin2018-05-151-106/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This removes: - ERR_get_state which really shouldn't be public API. - A bunch of functions that are really mostly useful within the library to add new errors. NB: I say mostly because they are also useful when trying to register a new error library, as osrandom does, but osrandom is written in C. Python code is more likely to be consuming errors. - All function codes but EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX because tests still reference it. Per PR #3609, function codes are kind of unstable. This finishes that up and cleans up the bindings. - The "line" versions of querying the error queue, just because no one seems to be using them and there's a lot. - Error-printing functions, which make less sense in Python since you'd probably wrap in an exception. Error codes probably could also do with cleaning, but I've left them alone for now.
* Remove ECDSA_sign_setup and *sign_ex bindings. (#4245)David Benjamin2018-05-151-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | They are unused. These functions have two purposes. They can be used to pass your own value of k, or to amoritize the cost of generating k. Messing up k is catastrophic to ECDSA, so best not to expose that one. ECDSA signing is also quite fast, so there isn't much point in the latter. (The API comes from DSA, which is a bit slower.) Moreover, ECDSA_sign is not the same as ECDSA_sign_setup + ECDSA_sign_ex. OpenSSL has some nonce hardening features that have to get skipped when doing this.
* Future proofing use of the six python version constants (#4238)Eric Brown2018-05-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Future proofing use of the six python version constants After reading [1], noticed that cryptography uses a lot of if six.PY3 blocks. The issue with this is that whenever Python 4 is released, this code in the else block will be executed even though it was only intended for Python 2. [1] http://astrofrog.github.io/blog/2016/01/12/stop-writing-python-4-incompatible-code/ Signed-off-by: Eric Brown <browne@vmware.com> * Use not PY2 instead
* Remove some unused RSA bindings. (#4243)David Benjamin2018-05-141-11/+0
| | | | | | RSA_blinding_off is a silly function. RSA_SSLV23_PADDING and RSA_X931_PADDING are obsolete. The low-level padding functions appear unused and the EVP_PKEY stuff is probably a bit nicer than expecting callers to RSA_NO_PADDING and do the padding by hand.
* Validate the public/private halves of EC keys on import. (#4241)David Benjamin2018-05-141-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Validate the public/private halves of EC keys on import. OpenSSL's API is a little finicky. If one sets the public key before the private key, it does not validate that they match. If set in the other order, it does validate this. In particular, KASValidityTest_ECCStaticUnified_NOKC_ZZOnly_init.fax describes error code 7 as: Result = F (7 - IUT's Static private key d changed-prikey validity) Reordering the two operations makes those tests to fail on key import, which is what CAVP appears to have intended. * Wrap to 79 rather than 80 columns