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* openssl: re-enable CMAC supportFelix Fietkau2016-08-091-1/+1
| | | | | | Needed by a few packages Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* openssl: re-enable NPN by defaultFelix Fietkau2016-07-241-1/+1
| | | | | | Several packages rely on it Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* openssl: add back the CAST cipher by defaultFelix Fietkau2016-07-241-1/+1
| | | | | | At least netatalk and some ipsec packages use it Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* openssl: revert the no-ripemd change, openssh needs that cipherFelix Fietkau2016-07-231-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* openssl: add option to disable SRP supportDirk Feytons2016-07-232-1/+11
| | | | Signed-off-by: Dirk Feytons <dirk.feytons@gmail.com>
* openssl: add --gc-sectionsDirk Feytons2016-07-231-1/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Dirk Feytons <dirk.feytons@gmail.com>
* openssl: remove some unneeded functionality and algorithmsDirk Feytons2016-07-232-3/+28
| | | | | | | | The patch needed for this commit has been sent upstream: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1155 Signed-off-by: Dirk Feytons <dirk.feytons@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> [add back bf and srp]
* openssl: add option to disable PSK supportDirk Feytons2016-07-232-1/+11
| | | | Signed-off-by: Dirk Feytons <dirk.feytons@gmail.com>
* openssl: add option for NPN supportDirk Feytons2016-07-233-1/+23
| | | | | | | | NPN has been superseded by ALPN so NPN is disabled by default The patch has been sent to OpenSSL for inclusion, see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1100 Signed-off-by: Dirk Feytons <dirk.feytons@gmail.com>
* openssl: add option to disable compression supportDirk Feytons2016-07-232-3/+15
| | | | | | | By default it's disabled. After the CRIME attack it seems the use of compression is discouraged. Signed-off-by: Dirk Feytons <dirk.feytons@gmail.com>
* openssl: add option to omit deprecated APIsDirk Feytons2016-07-232-1/+11
| | | | Signed-off-by: Dirk Feytons <dirk.feytons@gmail.com>
* openssl: replace ocf-crypto-headers with a header file from cryptodev-linuxFelix Fietkau2016-05-122-2/+293
| | | | Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
* openssl: Update to version 1.0.2hMichal Hrusecky2016-05-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Bump to the latest version, fixes several security issues: * CVE-2016-2107, CVE-2016-2105, CVE-2016-2106, CVE-2016-2109, CVE-2016-2176 More details at https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-1.0.2-notes.html Signed-off-by: Michal Hrusecky <Michal.Hrusecky@nic.cz>
* openssl: fix wrong build target stringsJo-Philipp Wich2016-04-151-3/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* branding: add LEDE brandingJohn Crispin2016-03-241-3/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org>
* openssl: update to 1.0.2g (8 CVEs)Jo-Philipp Wich2016-03-014-15/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CVE-2016-0704 s2_srvr.c overwrite the wrong bytes in the master-key when applying Bleichenbacher protection for export cipher suites. This provides a Bleichenbacher oracle, and could potentially allow more efficient variants of the DROWN attack. CVE-2016-0703 s2_srvr.c did not enforce that clear-key-length is 0 for non-export ciphers. If clear-key bytes are present for these ciphers, they *displace* encrypted-key bytes. This leads to an efficient divide-and-conquer key recovery attack: if an eavesdropper has intercepted an SSLv2 handshake, they can use the server as an oracle to determine the SSLv2 master-key, using only 16 connections to the server and negligible computation. More importantly, this leads to a more efficient version of DROWN that is effective against non-export ciphersuites, and requires no significant computation. CVE-2016-0702 A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper- threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions. CVE-2016-0799 The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. CVE-2016-0797 In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare. CVE-2016-0798 The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no way of distinguishing these two cases. Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around 300 bytes per connection. Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure a seed are not vulnerable. In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed. To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed. Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However, note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular, computations are currently not carried out in constant time. CVE-2016-0705 A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. CVE-2016-0800 A cross-protocol attack was discovered that could lead to decryption of TLS sessions by using a server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT cipher suites as a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle. Note that traffic between clients and non- vulnerable servers can be decrypted provided another server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT ciphers (even with a different protocol such as SMTP, IMAP or POP) shares the RSA keys of the non-vulnerable server. This vulnerability is known as DROWN (CVE-2016-0800). Recovering one session key requires the attacker to perform approximately 2^50 computation, as well as thousands of connections to the affected server. A more efficient variant of the DROWN attack exists against unpatched OpenSSL servers using versions that predate 1.0.2a, 1.0.1m, 1.0.0r and 0.9.8zf released on 19/Mar/2015 (see CVE-2016-0703 below). Users can avoid this issue by disabling the SSLv2 protocol in all their SSL/TLS servers, if they've not done so already. Disabling all SSLv2 ciphers is also sufficient, provided the patches for CVE-2015-3197 (fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1r and 1.0.2f) have been deployed. Servers that have not disabled the SSLv2 protocol, and are not patched for CVE-2015-3197 are vulnerable to DROWN even if all SSLv2 ciphers are nominally disabled, because malicious clients can force the use of SSLv2 with EXPORT ciphers. OpenSSL 1.0.2g and 1.0.1s deploy the following mitigation against DROWN: SSLv2 is now by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of: SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available. In addition, weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up are now disabled in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers. Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 48868
* openssl: update to 1.0.2f (fixes CVE-2016-0701, CVE-2015-3197)Felix Fietkau2016-01-286-20/+20
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 48531
* openssl: remove the separate configuration menu, use the implicit one (via ↵Felix Fietkau2016-01-181-7/+6
| | | | | | | | | | MENU:=1) Fixes warning on selecting OPENSSL_ENGINE_CRYPTO if openssl is not selected Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 48312
* OpenSSL: Added source/old to PKG_SOURCE_URLJohn Crispin2015-12-111-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenSSL moves old versions of the library from http://www.openssl.org/source/ to http://www.openssl.org/source/old/$version/ breaking the old links. That behavior breaks the OpenWRT-build every time OpenSSL releases a new version. This patch adds http://www.openssl.org/source/old/$version/ to the PKG_SOURCE_URL of OpenSSL to avoid breaking the build whenever OpenSSL releases a new version. Signed-off-by: Kevin Kirsch <ranlvor@starletp9.de> Reviewed-by: Alexander Dahl <post@lespocky.de> SVN-Revision: 47860
* openssl: add config option for no_hw supportHauke Mehrtens2015-12-092-2/+12
| | | | | | | | The hardware support is required by some 3rd party engines (tpm) Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <Eckert.Florian@googlemail.com> SVN-Revision: 47817
* openssl: update to version 1.0.2eHauke Mehrtens2015-12-036-15/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | This fixes the following security problems: * CVE-2015-3193 * CVE-2015-3194 * CVE-2015-3195) Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> SVN-Revision: 47726
* openssl: add one more mirrorLuka Perkov2015-07-281-0/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Luka Perkov <luka@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 46517
* openssl: update to v1.0.2d (CVE-2015-1793)Jo-Philipp Wich2015-07-095-29/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication. Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 46285
* openssl: disable parallel builds (spurious linking break)Steven Barth2015-06-161-1/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 46005
* openssl: 1.0.2c (srsly, you guys, srsly)Steven Barth2015-06-121-2/+2
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 45950
* openssl: fixes CVE-2015-4000 CVE-2015-1788 CVE-2015-1789 CVE-2015-1790 ↵Steven Barth2015-06-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | CVE-2015-1792 CVE-2015-1791 Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 45947
* openssl: 1.0.2b (hey, we made it nearly 3 months this time!)Steven Barth2015-06-117-32/+18
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 45946
* openssl: disable arm optimisation until we know why it fails on some socsJohn Crispin2015-04-101-2/+2
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 45343
* openssl: biweekly critical security updateSteven Barth2015-03-205-173/+17
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 44900
* openssl: enable ARM assembly accelerationJohn Crispin2015-03-062-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Tested myself on ixp4xx and mvebu, and (originally) by Daniel on i.MX6. Also tested on a MIPS target, to make sure the change to ASFLAGS does not break things. Based on a patch submitted by Daniel Drown: https://lists.openwrt.org/pipermail/openwrt-devel/2014-July/026639.html Signed-off-by: Claudio Leite <leitec@staticky.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Drown <dan-openwrt@drown.org> SVN-Revision: 44618
* openssl: fix upstream regression for non-ec buildsSteven Barth2015-02-092-1/+15
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 44364
* openssl: bump to 1.0.2Steven Barth2015-02-099-29/+29
| | | | | | | | Fixes CVE-2014-3513, CVE-2014-3567, CVE-2014-3568, CVE-2014-3566 Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 44332
* openssl: update to 1.0.1l *sigh*Steven Barth2015-01-151-2/+2
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 43976
* openssl: bump to 1.0.1jSteven Barth2015-01-084-54/+16
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 43875
* openssl: fix CVE-2014-3569Steven Barth2015-01-062-2/+40
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 43858
* openssl: reenable CMS (broke krb5)Steven Barth2014-11-041-2/+2
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 43176
* license info - revert r43155John Crispin2014-11-031-1/+0
| | | | | | | | turns out that r43155 adds duplicate info. Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 43167
* Add more license tags with SPDX identifiersJohn Crispin2014-11-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Note, that licensing stuff is a nightmare: many packages does not clearly state their licenses, and often multiple source files are simply copied together - each with different licensing information in the file headers. I tried hard to ensure, that the license information extracted into the OpenWRT's makefiles fit the "spirit" of the packages, e.g. such small packages which come without a dedicated source archive "inherites" the OpenWRT's own license in my opinion. However, I can not garantee that I always picked the correct information and/or did not miss license information. Signed-off-by: Michael Heimpold <mhei@heimpold.de> SVN-Revision: 43155
* Add a few SPDX tagsSteven Barth2014-11-021-1/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 43151
* openssl: optimize build options, disable old SSL versionsSteven Barth2014-10-302-6/+18
| | | | | | | Based on a patchset by Etienne CHAMPETIER <champetier.etienne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org> SVN-Revision: 43123
* openssl: fix target definition for x86_64 (#18182)Felix Fietkau2014-10-243-11/+12
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 43045
* openssl: host build fails when ccache is enabledJohn Crispin2014-10-201-0/+5
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 43002
* Revert "openssl: add host build."Felix Fietkau2014-10-201-56/+0
| | | | | | This reverts commit r42988 SVN-Revision: 42997
* openssl: add host build.John Crispin2014-10-201-0/+56
| | | | | | | | Only support Linux at the moment. Signed-off-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com> SVN-Revision: 42988
* openssl: add ABI_VERSION to fix package rebuild issues (fixes #18169)Felix Fietkau2014-10-191-0/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 42963
* openssl: update to v1.0.1j (CVE-2014-3513, CVE-2014-3567, CVE-2014-3568)Jo-Philipp Wich2014-10-163-13/+13
| | | | | | | | Also refresh patches and bump copyright year in Makefile. Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 42929
* openssl: another day another bug fix updateJohn Crispin2014-08-071-2/+2
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 42055
* openssl: version bump to 1.0.1hHauke Mehrtens2014-06-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | today appeared another serious vulnerability in openssl. More info is here http://ccsinjection.lepidum.co.jp. Users are advised to update to openssl 1.0.1h. Signed-off-by: Martin Strbacka <martin.strbacka@nic.cz> Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> SVN-Revision: 41026
* OpenSSL: update to 1.0.1gSteven Barth2014-04-081-2/+2
| | | | | | | | This fixes the Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160). Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be> SVN-Revision: 40421
* openssl: Fix x86_64 build on some 64bit host systemsFelix Fietkau2014-03-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On some build hosts openssl fails to install since openssl installs itself into lib64 while the openwrt Makefile expects the libs to end up in lib. install -m0644 .../openwrt/build_dir/target-x86_64_uClibc-0.9.33.2/openssl-1.0.1e/ipkg-install/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.* .../openwrt/build_dir/target-x86_64_uClibc-0.9.33.2/openssl-1.0.1e/ipkg-x86_64/libopenssl/usr/lib/ install: cannot stat '.../openwrt/build_dir/target-x86_64_uClibc-0.9.33.2/openssl-1.0.1e/ipkg-install/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.*': No such file or directory make[2]: *** [/openwrt/bin/x86_64/packages/libopenssl_1.0.1e-2_x86_64.ipk] Error 1 make[2]: Leaving directory `/openwrt/package/libs/openssl' make[1]: *** [package/libs/openssl/compile] Error 2 make[1]: Leaving directory `/openwrt' Set LIBDIR accordingly to fix this. Signed-off-by: Helmut Schaa <helmut.schaa@googlemail.com> SVN-Revision: 39885