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authorMark Williams <markrwilliams@gmail.com>2017-02-03 01:20:00 -0800
committerPaul Kehrer <paul.l.kehrer@gmail.com>2017-02-03 17:20:00 +0800
commit523b132b27905e79f393d9999ff232ab61500a9d (patch)
tree10374aa315c6d74d1b3f6ffb2afa77ef98cd1f13 /src/_cffi_src
parenta840aa27992685129e0954b6e30a974123dda136 (diff)
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Backport DH_check from OpenSSL 1.1.0. (#3375)
* Backport DH_check from OpenSSL 1.1.0. OpenSSL 1.0.2's DH_check considers the q parameter, allowing it validate more generators and primes; however, OpenSSL 1.1.0's DH_check includes code to handle errors in BN functions, so it's preferred. * Wrap DH_Check when using OpenSSL 1.1.0 or higher. * Adding DH_CHECK_* values missing from older OpenSSLs * Defensively guard DH_CHECK_* definitions with ifndef. This will prevent duplicate definitions when LibreSSL supports a version of DH_check that can return these. * Document the OpenSSL of origin for the DH_check code
Diffstat (limited to 'src/_cffi_src')
-rw-r--r--src/_cffi_src/openssl/dh.py115
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/_cffi_src/openssl/dh.py b/src/_cffi_src/openssl/dh.py
index a405da03..7e8a9704 100644
--- a/src/_cffi_src/openssl/dh.py
+++ b/src/_cffi_src/openssl/dh.py
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ FUNCTIONS = """
DH *DH_new(void);
void DH_free(DH *);
int DH_size(const DH *);
-int DH_check(const DH *, int *);
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *, const BIGNUM *, int *);
int DH_generate_key(DH *);
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *, const BIGNUM *, DH *);
@@ -34,6 +33,8 @@ void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *, const BIGNUM **, const BIGNUM **,
int DH_set0_pqg(DH *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
void DH_get0_key(const DH *, const BIGNUM **, const BIGNUM **);
int DH_set0_key(DH *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+
+int Cryptography_DH_check(const DH *, int *);
"""
MACROS = """
@@ -114,4 +115,116 @@ int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
return 1;
}
#endif
+
+#if CRYPTOGRAPHY_OPENSSL_LESS_THAN_110 || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#ifndef DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME
+#define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME 0x10
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE
+#define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE
+#define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE 0x40
+#endif
+
+/* DH_check implementation taken from OpenSSL 1.1.0pre6 */
+
+/*-
+ * Check that p is a safe prime and
+ * if g is 2, 3 or 5, check that it is a suitable generator
+ * where
+ * for 2, p mod 24 == 11
+ * for 3, p mod 12 == 5
+ * for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
+ * should hold.
+ */
+
+int Cryptography_DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+{
+ int ok = 0, r;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BN_ULONG l;
+ BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+
+ *ret = 0;
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (t1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (t2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (dh->q) {
+ if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+ *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+ else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
+ *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+ else {
+ /* Check g^q == 1 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->g, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_one(t1))
+ *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+ }
+ r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!r)
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME;
+ /* Check p == 1 mod q i.e. q divides p - 1 */
+ if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->p, dh->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_one(t2))
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ if (dh->j && BN_cmp(dh->j, t1))
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE;
+
+ } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) {
+ l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 24);
+ if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+ goto err;
+ if (l != 11)
+ *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+ } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_5)) {
+ l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 10);
+ if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+ goto err;
+ if ((l != 3) && (l != 7))
+ *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+ } else
+ *ret |= DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR;
+
+ r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!r)
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
+ else if (!dh->q) {
+ if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->p))
+ goto err;
+ r = BN_is_prime_ex(t1, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!r)
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ return (ok);
+}
+#else
+int Cryptography_DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) {
+ return DH_check(dh, ret);
+}
+#endif
"""