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Diffstat (limited to 'package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch')
-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch202
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 101 deletions
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch
index 4654bc8ea4..ac7d6b3495 100644
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-revert_aes_ccm_port.patch
@@ -1,3 +1,104 @@
+--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+@@ -301,15 +301,22 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
+ }
+
+
+-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
++static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
++ int encrypted)
+ {
+ __le16 mask_fc;
+ int a4_included, mgmt;
+ u8 qos_tid;
+- u16 len_a;
++ u8 *b_0, *aad;
++ u16 data_len, len_a;
+ unsigned int hdrlen;
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+
++ memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++
++ b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++ aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
+ /*
+ * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
+ * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
+@@ -331,21 +338,20 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+ else
+ qos_tid = 0;
+
+- /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
+- * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
+- * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
+- * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
+- * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
+- * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
+- */
+- b_0[0] = 0x1;
++ data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
++ if (encrypted)
++ data_len -= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+
++ /* First block, b_0 */
++ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
+ /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
+ * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
+ */
+ b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
+ memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+ memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
++ /* l(m) */
++ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
+
+ /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
+ * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
+@@ -401,8 +407,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ u8 *pos;
+ u8 pn[6];
+ u64 pn64;
+- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ if (info->control.hw_key &&
+ !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+@@ -455,9 +460,9 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ return 0;
+
+ pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
+- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+- skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
++ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
++ pos, skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -520,16 +525,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+ }
+
+ if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
+
+ if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
+- key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
++ key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
+ skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
+ data_len,
+- skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
++ skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN,
++ skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ }
+
--- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig
+++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ config MAC80211
@@ -244,104 +345,3 @@
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
} ccmp;
struct {
---- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
-@@ -301,16 +301,22 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
- }
-
-
--static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
-+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
- int encrypted)
- {
- __le16 mask_fc;
- int a4_included, mgmt;
- u8 qos_tid;
-- u16 len_a;
-+ u8 *b_0, *aad;
-+ u16 data_len, len_a;
- unsigned int hdrlen;
- struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
-
-+ memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+
-+ b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+ aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
- /*
- * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
- * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
-@@ -332,21 +338,20 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
- else
- qos_tid = 0;
-
-- /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
-- * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
-- * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
-- * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
-- * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
-- * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
-- */
-- b_0[0] = 0x1;
-+ data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
-+ if (encrypted)
-+ data_len -= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
-
-+ /* First block, b_0 */
-+ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
- /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
- * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
- */
- b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
- memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
- memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
-+ /* l(m) */
-+ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
-
- /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
- * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
-@@ -402,8 +407,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
- u8 *pos;
- u8 pn[6];
- u64 pn64;
-- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-
- if (info->control.hw_key &&
- !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
-@@ -456,9 +460,9 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
- return 0;
-
- pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
-- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 0);
-- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
-- skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
-+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
-+ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
-+ pos, skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -521,16 +525,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
- }
-
- if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
-- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-- u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
-- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 1);
-+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
-
- if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
-- key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
-+ key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
- skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
- data_len,
-- skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
-+ skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN,
-+ skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- }
-
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-07 17:58:14 +0000